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Abstract: Patient RB has a peculiar memory impairment wherein he experiences his memories in rich
contextual detail, but claims to not own them. His memories do not feel as if they happened to him. In this
paper, I provide an explanatory model of RB's phenomenology, the self-attentional model. I draw upon
recent work in neuroscience on self-attentional processing and global workspace models of conscious
recollection to show that RB has a self-attentional deficit that inhibits self-bias processes in broadcasting
the contents of episodic memories to the global workspace. Typically, self-related contents enjoy a higher
salience level than other-related contents. Elimination of bias toward self-related contents diminishes the
salience of those contents to the level of other-related contents. Because the typical high salience of
self-related content is necessary for the feeling of ownership, RB lacks the feeling of ownership. I also
discuss potential applications of the self-attentional model to other psychopathological cases.
0. Introduction
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently been engaged in a debate about the function
and nature of episodic memory (Allen & Fortin 2013; De Brigard 2014; Klein 2016; Michaelian 2011a;
Robins 2017; Tulving 1972, 2002). Tulving (1972) originally distinguished between the two memory
systems and this distinction was grounded in the nature of the stored content.2 Episodic content is
characterized by autobiographical detail, temporally dated episodes, and the temporal-spatial relations
between the episodes. Semantic content, on the other hand, is necessary for language use, characterized
by verbal symbols, meaning, and reference. Episodic memory is further distinguished from semantic
memory by its phenomenology (Tulving 1983, 1985, 1993, 2002). Autonoetic consciousness, the feeling
of mentally travelling back in time, is thought to be essential to episodic memory. Whereas semantic
memory lacks autonoetic consciousness. Tulving (1993), commenting on the famous amnesiac patient
KC, says that “for a rememberer to [episodically] remember something means that he or she is
autonoetically aware of a past happening in which he or she has participated” (pp. 69-70).3 Importantly,
3 See also Tulving (1985).
2 Tulving notes other dimensions where the two systems are supposed to differ, but content will suffice for present
purposes. For a review see Tulving (2002).
1 Special thank yous go to Cameron Buckner, Hayley Clatterbuck, Larry Shapiro, Farid Masrour, and Elizabeth
Schechter.
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autonoetic consciousness is not intrinsic to the content of an episodic memory. For Tulving, autonoesis is
the way that episodic content is experienced. However, episodic memory is not merely a particular kind of
mental experience, nor is it merely a particular kind of content. Rather, it is a complex state comprised of
both (Tulving 2002, 2005).
Stanley Klein (2016a) argues against Tulving’s view. For Klein, episodic and semantic memory
are not distinguished by content; indeed, memory content is stored system-neutrally. What makes a
memory episodic is whether autonoesis binds to content at retrieval. Klein uses the case of patient RB to
illustrate that he lacks some, “[m]echanisms that enables autonoetic consciousness to bond with retrieved
content, making possible recollective experience” (Klein 2016a, pg. 391). Klein thinks this allows him to
establish that episodic memory is a kind of mental experience-- that is, “it is the act of conjoining of
retrieved content with a particular mode of temporal subjectivity that makes experienced content ‘memory
content’” (pg.387). Thus, the distinction between episodic and semantic memory consists in the mode of
experience that is determined by whether autonoetic consciousness attaches to neutral content upon
retrieval. RB reports that his memories do not feel like his own-- that they lack the feeling of “mineness”.
For Klein, the feeling of ownership over one’s memories is entailed by autonoetic consciousness by being
a constituent part (see Klein 2016b, pg. 490). So, if RB lacks the feeling of ownership, then he lacks
autonoetic consciousness. In agreement with Tulving, Klein thinks that autonoesis is essential to episodic
memory. Contrary to Tulving, Klein thinks that episodic memory is just a kind of mental experience, and
is not distinguished from semantic memory by its content.
As far as I know, no mechanistic explanation for RB’s condition has been given in the literature.
That is, the “binding mechanism” that Klein gestures at, has not been identified. In this paper, I hope to
make progress toward identifying this mechanism. While I will not be identifying the binding mechanism
for autonoesis, I will endeavor to mechanistically explain the feeling of ownership. ‘Autonoesis’ is at best
an umbrella term for many different kinds of abilities and phenomenal experiences. At worst, it is a
conceptually muddled category. I intend to explain the lost feeling of ownership without taking a stance
on what autonoesis is or what it entails.
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I draw upon recent work in neuroscience on self-attentional processing (Humphreys and Sui
2016) and global workspace models of conscious recollection (De Brigard 2012) to show that RB has a
self-attentional deficit that inhibits self-bias processing in broadcasting the contents of episodic memories
to the global workspace. It is important to note at the start that the self-attentional model I provide is
tentative. The only data on RB that we have are excerpts from an interview with Klein. There is no
neuropsychological profile of RB, so my tentative explanation is based almost entirely on these excerpts.
Indeed, RB has been pretty widely discussed in philosophy journals as if he is a case like KC or HM. The
reality is that RB is not like these more well known cases precisely because there is no
neuropsychological profile. However, the goal is to provide an explanatory model that can be empirically
tested, opening an avenue for future research. Moreover, based on the explanation I provide, I argue for a
necessary condition on the feeling of ownership in episodic recollection.4 If successful, the self-attentional
model of ownership might go some way toward identifying the neural correlates of autonoesis, as well as
having wider applicability to other kinds of self-disturbances.5
The strategy for the paper is as follows.  In section 1, I describe the case of RB and how it is
supposed to establish Klein’s position. In section 2, I review evidence for the necessity of attention in
conscious episodic recollection. In section 3, I review evidence for a separate self-attentional network
(SAN) in self-bias processing. In section 4, I review additional evidence for the self-attentional network’s
involvement in episodic retrieval processes. In section 5, I tie together the evidence in sections 2, 3, and 4
for a mechanistic explanation of RB’s condition. Additionally, I argue for a necessary condition on the
feeling of ownership based on the self-attentional model. Finally, in section 6, I discuss predictions that
the self-attentional model makes about RB and gesture at potential applications of the model to depression
and schizophrenia.
1. The Case of RB
5 I say “might go some way toward identifying the neural correlates of autonoesis”, because I wish to remain neutral
about whether ownership is a constituent of autonoesis.
4 This condition, to be elaborated on later, is a certain level of salience of self-related content. By “necessary”, I
mean that the feeling of ownership cannot come about without such salience. If one thinks that the feeling of
ownership supervenes on content, then the salience of self-related content is part of the supervenience base.
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In this section, I will introduce the reader to patient RB, show how RB is supposed to establish
Klein’s position, and then briefly discuss how I am thinking about the feeling of ownership.
RB was in a traumatic accident that initially resulted in retrograde and anterograde amnesia. RB
recovered from the amnesias, but reported that his memories did not feel like they were his own-- as if
these memories were not things he originally experienced. Interestingly, his reports suggest that this is the
only disruption in his recollective experiences. He reports vivid scene construction, self-referential details,
and continuity between episodes. Consider a few notable quotes from RB:
I remember eating pizza at XXX in Isla Vista about a month before [his accident], but the
memory belongs to someone else. But knowing I like pizza in the present . . . now . . . is owned
by me . . . when I recall memories from my past I intellectually know they are about me. It just
does not feel like it . . . when I remember scenes from before [the accident] they do not feel as if
they happened to me—though intellectually I know they did.
I can picture the scene perfectly clearly ... studying with my friends in our study lounge. I can
‘relive’ it in the sense of re-running the experience of being there. But it has the feeling of
imagining, [as if] re-running an experience that my parents described from their college days. It
did not feel like it was something that really had been a part of my life. Intellectually I suppose I
never doubted that it was a part of my life. Perhaps because there was such continuity of
memories that fit a pattern that lead up to the present time. But that in itself did not help change
the feeling of ownership (Klein and Nichols 2012, pg.686; emphasis added).
It seems clear that RB’s semantic memory is intact because, for example, he knows that he likes pizza.
Indeed, it’s likely that RB uses his semantic memory to make inferences about what actually happened to
him despite it not feeling that way. And as RB states in the second quoted passage, the continuity of the
remembered events seem to play a role in his judging that these events happened to him.6 Moreover, the
issue does not seem to be a lack of content, but rather how that content is presented to consciousness. RB
seems to be a participant in his memories-- there is self-referential content-- but they are not experienced
as such.
Another interesting aspect of RB’s pathology is that the lack of feeling of ownership seems only
to be for memories prior to the accident (premorbid). Consider this exchange between RB and Klein:
6 In fact, RB apparently now claims ownership over all of his memories (pre- and post-morbid). He does not say that
he feels ownership over all of his memories, however. So his coming to judge that he owns all of his memories
might very well be explained by inferences made based on his semantic memory.
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S.B.K .: You say you own your memories from after the accident. What do you mean by “owning”
your memories?
R.B. : They feel like things that happened to me. I can see them (in my head). ... They feel like
part of my life ... my past ... things that happened to me. I was there. I guess that’s what I mean by
owning them(memory). They’re mine, my past ... not something I just know about. ... I was there
... lived through it.
S.B.K. : And memories from before the accident—you don’t feel like you own them?
R.B. : Right. I see them play in my head. Like watching a movie. I watch them, they fit (with what
I know about my past), but I don’t own them. ... I don’t feel like I was there (when the events
happened). I know they must be mine, must have happened to me, but I feel like I’m watching a
movie about me that I didn’t make (Parentheses added for clarification—based on discussions
with R.B.) (2019, pg.492).
Here, RB suggests that the lack of feeling of ownership is not associated with memories formed
post-morbid, only premorbid. More curious still is that RB reports that he was able to plan for the future,
albeit with some difficulty:
I was able to plan for the future. Although my working memory impairment. . . made it
challenging. When I slowly returned to work, it was hard to plan a complex strategy. I had to
think of useful things to do and then do them. The best compensation I found was to separate the
planning of the strategy from the execution. It worked best if I made a list of “Things To Do”
(Klein 2016a, pg. 393).
Here, and elsewhere, it seems that RB has not lost the ability to self-represent. Indeed, he explicitly states
that he does not have an identity problem (Klein and Nichols 2012, pg.687). However, it is an open
question whether the lack of feeling ownership extends to other self-related states besides memory, e.g.,
dreaming, perception, imagination.7 Indeed, the difficulty with planning for his personal future might
suggest that there are disruptions beyond memory.8
In the introduction, I said that Klein uses this case of RB to argue that memory content is stored
system-neutrally and becomes episodic only if autonoesis binds to it at retrieval. Because the feeling of
ownership is a constituent of autonoesis, the lack of the feeling of ownership, is a lack of autonoesis.
Hence, RB’s memories are not episodic. I will not be engaging with Klein’s view, however. I intend only
8 I discuss this at length in section 6.1.
7 Personal correspondence with Klein.
5
to supply a mechanistic explanation of RB’s lack of feeling of ownership. Which, if successful, makes
progress on identifying the autonoesis binding mechanism that Klein thinks is malfunctioning in RB.
So what is the feeling of ownership?9 It will help to say what it is not. RB is aware of the fact that
he is instantiating a memory-- that he is in a particular mental state. This is minimal ownership. Minimal
ownership, following Bradley (2019), is mere awareness that one is in a particular mental state. This kind
of awareness arises out of the de se content of that mental state. But there is a more interesting sense of
ownership that RB lacks-- the feeling of “mineness”-- or as William James (1890) put it, the feeling of
warmth and intimacy. RB does not feel as if his memories happened to him. Jordi Fernandez (2019)
analyzes the feeling of ownership, with respect to a memory, as the feeling that the memory matches the
past. Without getting into the details of Fernandez’s view, intuitively this is the feeling that RB lacks. RB
lacks the non-conceptual, pre-reflective sense that his memories are his (Klein 2018). And this is the
sense in which I will proceed.1011 In the next section, I will lay out the first tool on the workbench for
building my explanatory model of RB’s condition.
2. The Necessity of Attention in Conscious Recollection
In the next two sections, I will be laying two tools on the workbench for explaining RB’s curious
lack of ownership over his memories: the necessity of attention in conscious recollection and the
self-attentional network model of self-bias processing. But before getting into the details of these tools, I
11 Some philosophers think that “mineness” should be understood in intentionalist terms, that is, that mineness is
identical to or supervenes on content (Fernandez 2019). Some think that it should be understood in non-intentionalist
terms. For example, that mineness is a feature of the mode of presentation of content (Klein 2018), or mineness is an
metacognitive epistemic feeling (Perrin et al. 2020). Still others think that mineness is primitive (Billon 2017).
Given that I think the feeling of ownership supervenes on the salience of self-related contents, my account assumes
intentionalism.
10 De Vignemont (2011) distinguishes between three accounts of the relation between ownership and disownership:
independent account theory, unified account theory, and discovery theory. The independent account states that the
feeling of ownership is independent of the feeling of disownership, i.e., lack of ownership does not entail
disownership. The unified account states that lack of ownership entails disownership and vice versa. Finally, the
discovery account, which de Vignemont endorses, states that lack of ownership does not entail disownership, but
lack of ownership and awareness of this fact does. I agree with de Vignemont that the independent account is
mistaken. But I make no claims about whether the unified or discovery account is correct. However, my view is
compatible with both.
9 I am aware that there is a distinction between judgements of ownership and feelings of ownership (Bayne and
Pacherie 2007). Roughly, one judges that they own X, when they have a belief that they own X. In contrast, the
feeling of ownership is characterized as a kind of non-conceptual awareness (de Vignemont 2007; Klein 2018). This
latter notion is what I will assume.
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want to provide an analogy to the kind of explanation that I will be giving. This will, hopefully, frame the
rest of the discussion in a useful way for the reader.
2.1 An Analogy Explanation: Capgras’ Syndrome
Capgras syndrome is a rare condition in which patients report that their loved ones are imposters.
For example, patient DS claimed that his parents were imposters when he saw them. Hirstein and
Ramachandran (1997) provide an elegant explanation. They note that when a person is considered a loved
one, one’s perception of them contains a kind of affective “warmth” or “glow”. These researchers
measured skin conductance responses to photographs of familiar people against responses to non-familiar
people in patients with Capgras syndrome. They found that there was no difference in the patient’s
responses, but controls showed significant differences. The researchers argue that when patients view
their loved ones and the affective glow is not present (as it was prior to the onset of the syndrome),
patients post-hoc rationalize that the loved one is an imposter. There is something like an expectation that
the affective component will be present in their perception, and when it is not, the patient tries to explain
the discrepancy. I intend to provide a similar explanation for RB. Namely, that prior to the accident,
self-bias processing played a crucial role in the recollective experience-- it raised the saliency of
self-referential contents higher than other contents-- but because of the accident, self-bias is no longer
playing that role. There is a kind of expectation that the saliency of self-referential content will be the
same as before the accident, and when it’s not, RB feels that his memories are not his own.12 I now turn to
a discussion of the necessity of attention for conscious recollection.
2.2 The Role of Attention in Episodic Recollection
Felipe de Brigard (2012) argues that attention is necessary, but not sufficient for conscious
episodic recollection. In particular, he argues that internal attention (as opposed to external attention) is
necessary. He follows Chun et al.’s (2011) taxonomy of attention according to which there are two basic
attentional systems distinguished by the type of information attention operates over. External attention has
as its objects external, environmental information, whereas internal attention operates over mental
12 I do not mean that there is an explicit representation of such an expectation.
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representations (Lau and colleagues 2004, as well as Chun et al. 2011, provide behavioral and
neuroimaging evidence for such a view). Even though these systems are distinct in virtue of the
information they operate over, there are shared features computationally as well as neuroanatomically.
Chun et al. claim that both systems filter information, they are selective about that information, and they
modulate other systems’ performance.
Neuroanatomically, these systems are both implicated in prefrontal regions as well as anterior
cingulated cortices. But for all they share, there are differences: a study by Nobre et al. (2004) showed
that the right inferior parietal cortex extending to posterior angular gyrus is preferentially involved in
external attention tasks (across modalities). Whereas the bilateral intraparietal sulcus, right ventral and
bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortices are preferentially involved in internal attention tasks.
The dominant view on attention’s role in episodic memory is that it is crucial for encoding, but
not for retrieval. Parietal lesion patients with attentional deficits show no impairment during memory
(recall) tasks, but severe impairment in encoding (see Baddeley et al. 1984). De Brigard notes however
that these experiments were not using a divided attention paradigm.13 When this paradigm is
implemented, patients with attentional deficits show severe impairment in recall tasks. The impairment is
especially evident on the “remember”/ “know” task-- patients are typical for “know” judgements, but are
impaired for “remember” judgements. This suggests that attention is especially implicated for episodic
recollection. Other evidence comes from Berryhill et al. (2007). Patients with bilateral ventral parietal
lesions (implicated in internal attention) showed reduced levels of free-recall during autobiographical
memory tasks and in particular decreased levels of vividness and detail (see also Bisiach and Luzzatti
1978).
De Brigard hopes that at this point he has convinced the reader that internal attention is at least
necessary for episodic recollection. But as he notes, there is still the question of whether attention is
required for conscious recollection. Drawing on the global workspace model of consciousness (Dehaene
13 Standard divided attention paradigms have subjects engage in tasks that divide their attention between the two
tasks. This paradigm is typically used to measure whether attention is implicated in the target task.
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and Changeux 2000), he suggests that internal attention enhances (or increases) gamma-band responses
above threshold (30-100Hz) in local processing networks which renders them available for broadcast. In
other words, attention is the gatekeeper to consciousness for episodic contents (although as we will see,
the gatekeeper is necessary, but not sufficient).
De Brigard notes that there are many regions that contribute to episodic recollection. Here’s a
recap:
1) Prefrontal cortex (PFC): initiation, monitoring, and maintenance (esp. Ventrolateral (vlPFC) and
dorsolateral (dlPFC) regions)
2) Medial temporal lobe (MTL): required for successful binding and accessing of relational
information from neocortex
3) Parietal cortex: filtering and selection of information distributed across sensory cortices
Perhaps not so coincidentally the prefrontal/medial-temporal/parietal network of activation is associated
with information processing that gives rise to conscious awareness. This local network can globally
broadcast its contents when the gamma-band responses reach threshold levels (between 30 and 100Hz). It
turns out that attentional modulation of those contents spike the gamma frequency. So, attentional
processing on those contents can increase the gamma-band responses above threshold.
If parietal regions modulate the availability of representations into the global workspace, then
patients with parietal damage should (ex hypothesi) experience a loss of autonoesis. The Berryhill et al.
(2007) experiments (mentioned above) confirm this. Fewer representations to broadcast diminishes the
subjective experience of recollection. Another reason is worth quoting:
The fact that richer retrieval cues increase the likelihood of successful retrieval is at the heart of
the notion of retrieval support, but it also suggests that these richer cues work precisely because
they have a better chance of ‘highlighting’ the relevant memory trace than poorer retrieval cues
(De Brigard 2012, pg. 7).
De Brigard notes that this line is supported by Tulving’s (1982) synergistic ecphory model. This model
states that the degree of subjective recollection is the degree to which the memory traces interface with
the retrieval cue. Unfortunately, there isn’t much evidence in the way of neurology for this model.
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Moving forward, there are two main reasons for thinking that attention is not sufficient for
conscious recollection. Because this part is not as important for my purposes, I will only list them briefly:
1) Successful recollection requires that the memorial contents one attends to be reinstated during
retrieval. This is a matter of priority. If certain contents are missing prior to attentional
processing, then there will be a recollective failure not attributable to attention.
2) Attention is not an “all or nothing” process for broadcast. So, even if attention acts on the
memorial content to increase gamma-band responses, it might not reach threshold levels.
If the above evidence is convincing, then we have good reason for thinking that attention is necessary for
conscious recollection of episodic memories. As for the case of RB, we now have a tool on the
workbench that goes some way towards an alternative explanation. Episodic memories contain
self-referential content, e.g., “I am eating pizza at XXX in Isla Vista.” I want to suggest that attention is
not appropriately operating over those contents (the “I”) to give rise to the feeling of ownership. Here, RB
experiences the rich contextual details and can even see himself in the memory (there is some reference to
oneself as a participant in the episode), but he doesn’t feel ownership due to a lack of self-biasing. In the
next section, I’ll review evidence for a separate self-attentional network (SAN) that will explain why
attention does not appropriately operate over the self-referential content of the memory. Indeed, the
evidence for SAN will indicate a particular mechanistic explanation for RB’s condition.
3. The Self-Attentional Network and Self-Bias
In the previous section, I laid one tool on the workbench to explain RB’s phenomenology. In this
section, I will lay the second tool on the workbench-- the self-attentional network. Humphreys and Sui
(2016) think that self-bias modulates attention. In their discussion paper, the authors review three
experimental paradigms for assessing self-biases and argue that self-related information has a differential
impact on allocation of attention and furthermore, that it can alter the saliency of a stimulus. To account
for this function, they propose a self-attention network that responds specifically to self-related stimuli
and interacts with general attentional resources.
3.1 Behavioral Evidence of Self-Bias
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Imagine being at a cocktail party. You are discussing the recent election with your friends and the
conversation is getting heated. All of a sudden, you whirl around because you hear your name mentioned
across the room. This phenomenon is known as the “cocktail party effect”. It turns out that humans have a
self-bias toward their own name over other names. But this case is particularly puzzling because you were
talking amongst friends on a complex topic that demanded many attentional resources. Yet, seemingly
miraculously you attended to your name being mentioned from across the room. Presumably, there is lots
of chatter at cocktail parties and your attentional processing filters out most of it so that you can talk with
your friends without distraction. But when your name is called, it seems that the filter fails to stop the
name from making demands on attention. What accounts for this? The evidence suggests that the
processing of our own name is pre-attentive, automatic, and cues attention. For example, Moray (1959)
found that subjects could report more words heard in an unattended ear after the presentation of their own
name in that ear. Or consider the work of Bargh & Pratto (1986) and Wood & Cowan (1995) which shows
that the central presentation of one’s name can disrupt detection in peripheral vision. There is a general
worry here though-- perhaps our own name is just extremely familiar to us versus other names or words.
This would mean that there is nothing special about self-related information-- that it does not activate
special self-representations or modulate attention any differently qua self.
Similar self-bias effects have been reported for one’s own face-- that is, there is a self-bias for
own-face versus other-face. In general, subjects are faster and more accurate at making perceptual
judgments about the orientation of faces if they see their own face versus the face of another. One’s own
face is more salient than other faces. Here, the worries about familiarity are still present but perhaps less
so than own-name effects. For example, Sui and Humphreys (2013) showed that
[R]esponses to a friend’s face varied across categorization tasks as did responses to the face of a
stranger, suggesting a qualitative distinction between the processing of self-faces and other faces.
Given that a friend’s face will be highly familiar relative to the face of a stranger, then the
self-face advantage cannot easily be attributed to (at least linear) effects of familiarity
(Humphreys and Sui 2016, pg.8).
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There is also evidence that own-face bias can cue attention. Liu, He, Rotshtein, and Sui (2016) showed
that when subjects are cued with their own face versus the face of others, they could better identify a
target letter.
Finally, this last experimental paradigm is supposed to set aside the familiarity objection. Subjects
are trained on shape-name pairs, e.g. own name-Square, friend’s name-Circle, stranger’s name-Triangle.
And then presented with pairs that may or may not be the same as the training set, e.g., own
name-Triangle. Researchers found that there was a substantial advantage for matching self-related pairs
over other-related pairs, i.e., self-related pairs are more salient than other-related pairs. Interestingly, when
researchers increased the frequency of familiar and self-related pairs equally, there was still only a bias for
the self pairs. This indicates that the self-related stimuli were differentially preferred to familiar and
stranger stimuli.
3.2 The Neural Basis of Self-Bias: The Self-Attentional Network (SAN)
For my part, the behavioral evidence does not avoid the familiarity objection because the self bias
might persist in virtue of being more familiar than the friend pair stimulus, e.g., own name-Square is more
familiar than friend’s name-Circle, and that is why subjects have the advantage for self pairs over friend
pairs. But setting this aside, the neural evidence is perhaps more convincing. fMRI imaging revealed
preferential activation for self-related stimuli in the ventral-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the
left-posterior superior temporal sulcus (lpSTS). Humphreys and Sui note that the vmPFC is suggested to
be the seat of self-representation and the lpSTS is the seat of social attention to the environment.
Temporally speaking, they note that the vmPFC is activated prior to the lpSTS suggesting that the
self-representation primes attentional control. Contrastingly, for other-related pairs, fronto-parietal
network was preferentially activated. So it turns out that self-related stimuli activates independent neural
correlates. More interesting still, the authors note that damage to the vmPFC results in hypo-self
responses (self-bias is eliminated) and damage to the lpSTS results in hyper-self responses.
To account for this data, Humphreys and Sui propose a self-attention network with three
components (see figure 1):
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1) A general purpose top-down attentional control mechanism (includes dorsolateral PFC and
intraparietal sulcus),
2) Self-representation by the vmPFC,
3) And bottom-up orienting by the lpSTS.
They claim that vmPFC is triggered by the presence of self-related information which modulates
subsequent attentional processing to the lpSTS and the general attentional control network. In general,
there are bottom-up and top-down influences between the SAN and the general attentional control
network.
FIGURE 1. The Self-Attention Network (SAN). Here we distinguish between a top-down attentional network
(including the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)) and a network that responds
in a bottom-up fashion to self-related information (the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)). Black arrows indicate excitatory connections. Grey arrows indicate
inhibitory connections. Dotted arrows (to and from the pSTS) highlight that there is currently little direct evidence
for these functional connections (from Humphreys and Sui 2016, pg.12).
Neuroimaging evidence for these connections comes from Sui et al. (2013).14 These researchers showed
preferential activations and coupling between the lpSTS and vmPFC for self-related contents in a
matching task (as in the own name-shape/stranger name-shape task), whereas there was preferential
activation only in the DLPFC and IPS for other-related matching. The idea here is that when self-related
content is present, vmPFC and lpSTS activate and exert bottom-up modulation on the general attentional
14 See De Brigard et al. (2015) for evidence that the vmPFC is preferentially involved in tasks (episodic recollection,
future mental time travel, and episodic counterfactual thinking) with self-related contents. See Denny et al. (2012)
for a meta-analysis of over 100 neuroimaging studies on self- versus other-related stimuli. Finally, see Wagner,
Waxby, and Heatherton (2012) for an extensive review of the mPFC’s role in self-related processing.
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control network. When there are no self-related contents present, there is no such bottom-up modulation
from these nodes-- the attentional control network operates business-as-usual.
If this is convincing, then we have good reason for thinking that there is a separate attentional
network dedicated to processing self-referential information. This network, constituted by the vmPFC and
lpSTS, explains self-bias processing, e.g., the cocktail party effect, by having a dedicated, bottom-up
mechanism that activates and exerts influence on the general attentional control network to increase the
salience of self-referential content.
4. SAN and Retrieval Processes
The discussion of the last section focused on self-bias and attention in perception. What about the
role of self-bias in episodic recollection? If the SAN is supposed to be part of the explanation for RB’s
lack of feeling of ownership, then there must be evidence that the SAN is implicated in memorial
processing. This section provides evidence for cortical midline regions’ involvement in retrieval
processes.15 Although there is no direct evidence that the SAN is implicated in retrieval processes
(although see Cunningham 2016), there is ample evidence of bias for self-referential content in
recollection (Symons and Johnston 1997). Moreover, ventral medial areas of prefrontal cortex are
consistently found to be implicated in this processing (for a review see Cabeza and Nyberg 1997; Nyberg
et al. 1996). Since we have independent reasons for thinking that internal attention is necessary for
conscious episodic recollection and the SAN’s involvement in self-bias processing generally, the evidence
provided here gives us reason to think that the SAN is involved in retrieval processes of episodic
recollection specifically. I will briefly discuss three studies and summarize the key takeaway message.16
The self-reference effect in memory (SRE) is well documented (Brédart 2016; Symons and
Johnston 1997; Turk et al. 2008; Turk et al. 2011; van der Bos et al. 2010). When stimuli are processed
with reference to the self, they are generally better remembered than stimuli processed otherwise. For
example, Turk et al. (2012) asked subjects to encode items under imagined ownership by themselves or
16 Additional evidence can be found at Arzy and Schacter (2019); Dafni-Merom and Arzy (2020).
15 By “cortical midline regions”, I mean areas such as medial PFC, posterior cingulate cortices, and anterior
cingulate cortices, among others. Of course, I am most interested in medial PFC.
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another person. The researchers found a significant advantage for recall of personally owned items
compared to other-owned items. Using a “remember-know” paradigm, they found the SRE correlated
with higher “remember” responses. More interestingly, when a divided attention condition was
implemented at encoding, the SRE was eliminated. Turk and colleagues hypothesized that the SRE relies
on attentional resources at encoding.
4.1 SRE at Retrieval Implicates MPFC17
Our present concern, however, is with attentional resources at retrieval. Fossati et al. (2004)
investigated the neural correlates of retrieval success using an SRE paradigm. The researchers had
subjects encode positive and negative personality traits in self-referential, semantic, and phonemic
conditions. They then gave the subjects a recognition task where they were presented with new and old
words and asked to select the previously presented words. The behavioral data showed a significant SRE
for recall of both positive and negative traits. fMRI imaging during the recognition task revealed, “the
successful retrieval of self-encoded emotional personality traits reactivated the right MPFC and activated
a specific neural network including posterior cortical regions and sub-cortical areas” (Fossati et al. 2004,
pg.1603). Contrastingly, while the MPFC was active for other encoded stimuli, greater activation was
reported for the self-encoded stimuli. Since attention is necessary for conscious recollection and the SAN
implicates the MPFC, a plausible explanation for this greater activation is that retrieval for self-related
contents triggers the MPFC to bias general attentional resources in broadcasting. So not only is MPFC
crucial for encoding of self-related stimuli, it is also crucial to retrieval processes of self-related content.
4.2 Incorporation of Self in Episodic Memories Implicates MPFC
Additional evidence comes from Kurczek et al. (2015) showing a double dissociation between
hippocampal and MPFC contributions to autobiographical memory recall. The researchers had subjects
recall a past event given a neutral word cue. Some subjects had hippocampal damage, some had MPFC
damage, and the others were healthy controls. Quantifying contextual details and self reference, Kurczek
17 The reader may have noticed that I am discussing the MPFC now and not the vmPFC. But the vmPFC is a part of
the MPFC. The studies discussed in this section used a coarser grain of analysis.
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and colleagues found that patients with hippocampal damage, “showed disruptions in their ability to
construct highly detailed episodic events across all time periods, but this deficit did not extend to their
ability to incorporate themselves in the narratives of those (re)constructions” (2015, pg.123). In contrast,
patients with MPFC damage, “showed the opposite pattern. They were able to construct highly detailed
episodic events but incorporated themselves in the narratives of those (re)constructions less often than
healthy participants” (pg.123). Of present interest is the latter finding-- that MPFC seems to be implicated
in self-reference for autobiographical recall. Kurczek et al.’s study was not testing encoding because these
events were memories previously encoded. Thus, MPFC is implicated in episodic retrieval processes
especially for self-referential content.
4.3 Retrieval of Self-Related Content in Episodic Recollection Implicates MPFC
Finally, a series of studies by Moroz (1999) showed aged-related differences in “remember”
versus “know” responses. Subjects encoded stimuli in terms of self, other, social desirability, and
syllable.18 After the encoding task, subjects were given a recognition test similar to the one given in
Fossati et al. (2004), but with a “remember-know” paradigm. Young adults reported more “remember”
responses than older adults especially for self-encoded words. Moroz hypothesizes that this is due to
age-related reductions in cognitive resources, e.g., attentional resources.
To test this hypothesis, Moroz implemented a divided attention paradigm at retrieval for young
adults. The results show that young adults in the divided attention condition had reduced “remember”
responses on par with the older adults in a full attention condition. The “remember” responses were
especially reduced for self-encoded words. This suggests attentional resources are implicated in retrieval
of previously encoded stimuli, but especially for self-encoded stimuli.
Finally, Moroz conducted a PET study at retrieval. The imaging revealed preferential activation
of anterior-frontal areas of the right PFC for retrieval of self-encoded stimuli. Other-encoded stimuli
showed preferential activation of more posterior-frontal areas of right PFC. Moreover, differences were
18 The stimuli were trait adjectives. For the social desirability condition, subjects judged how desirable each trait is.
For the syllable condition, subjects judged how many syllables the word has.
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revealed along the left-right axis. Moroz reports, “whereas the self [condition] was associated with a
pattern of neural activity that included bilateral frontal areas, the social desirability [condition] was
associated with a pattern of neural activity that included a left frontal area and medial anterior cingulate,
and the other [condition] was associated with a pattern of neural activity that included only medial
anterior cingulate” (1999, pg.108). Taken together, Moroz (1999) provides compelling evidence that
attentional resources are recruited at retrieval for episodic recollection. More specifically, right prefrontal
areas (including MPFC) are recruited for retrieval of self-related stimuli.
At this point, one might object that none of this evidence demonstrates that an impaired SAN
gives rise to the kind of disownership experience that RB has. That is, none of the evidence canvassed
here explicitly shows that if the modulatory connections between the SAN and general attention are
severed, then subjects will report feeling disownership over their memories. In way of response,  I don’t
think that means this account is mistaken. Rather, from what I gather, the question of whether an impaired
SAN can give rise to feelings of disownership has not even been pursued. A lack of evidence is not
evidence of a lack. Indeed, I think this is what makes my view novel, interesting, and worth pursuing
further.
We started this section with the question of whether there is any evidence that midline regions
(specifically MPFC), are implicated in episodic retrieval processes. The question is important because we
have good reason for thinking that attention is necessary for conscious episodic recollection (De Brigard
2012) and that the SAN biases general attentional resources for self-related perceptual stimuli
(Humphreys and Sui 2016), but if these tools are going to explain RB’s phenomenology, we need
evidence that the SAN biases attentional resources for broadcast of self-related memories. The three
studies discussed in this section all implicated the MPFC (Brodmann’s area 8/9) in retrieval processes of
self-related memories. Fossati and colleagues showed greater activation in this area for recall of
self-encoded personality traits. Kurczek and colleagues demonstrated a double dissociation between
hippocampal contributions to contextual details and MPFC contributions to self-related contents of
autobiographical memories. Moroz reported reduced “remember” responses, especially for self encoded
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stimuli, if attention was divided at retrieval. Furthermore, Moroz provided neuroimaging that showed
preferential activation of BA 8/9 for retrieval of self-encoded stimuli. In the next section, I will be tying
these threads together for an explanation of RB’s lost feeling of ownership.
5. The Self-Attentional Model of RB’s Lost Feeling of Ownership
5.1 Outline of Self-Attentional Model
Having reviewed neuroscientific evidence for the necessity of attention in conscious recollection
and the self-attentional network, I turn now to tying these threads together for an explanation of RB’s lack
of ownership over his memories. In broad strokes, there are three pieces to the self-attentional model.
Firstly, as the global workspace model states, internal attention operates over memorial content in local
processing networks to increase gamma-band responses above threshold so that the memory is broadcast
to the global workspace. This, as de Brigard has argued, is what accounts for conscious episodic
recollection. Secondly, the typical high salience of self-content is partially constitutive of the
supervenience base for the feeling of memory ownership. That is, the typical salience of self-related
contents is necessary for the feeling of ownership. I will elaborate on this more below. And lastly,
self-bias processing (on memorial content) is sufficient for the production of the typical threshold level of
salience. As I showed in previous sections, the self-attentional network is biased toward self-related
contents and increases the salience of such contents. Altogether, in a neurotypical subject, self-related
memorial content activates the self-attentional network and increases its salience. This typical high level
of salience is partially constitutive of the supervenience base for the feeling of ownership. As per the
global workspace model, internal attention operates over this supervenience base. And assuming
phenomenology supervenes on content, the feeling of ownership comes about.  I have provided evidence
for the first and last parts of this model already, so I now turn to evidence for the necessity of the typical
high level of salience of self-related content for the feeling of ownership. After that, I will use this model
to explain RB’s lost feeling of ownership.
5.2 The Necessity of Salience
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That self-content is more salient than other-content is not controversial. The self-bias literature
briefly reviewed here demonstrates that self-content is distinctive in its salience. But that it is necessary
for the feeling of ownership is controversial. So here I defend premise 1. Assume for reductio that
self-content does not differ in salience from other-content. Then, all else being equal, the experience of
each should not differ either. But the experience of each does differ. Indeed, we have a feeling of
ownership for self-content, and not for other-related content. So, salience must differ between self- and
other-content.
For example, when I remember taking a road trip with my partner to Duluth, I have a feeling of
ownership over this memory-- I feel as if I experienced that road trip. Contrastingly, suppose a friend of
mine tells me about a road trip she took recently. It is not the case that I have a feeling of ownership
associated with that road trip-- I do not feel as if that road trip happened to me. This difference in
experience can be explained by the difference in salience. In the former case, my friend is the participant
in the road trip (other-content). In the latter case, I am a participant in the road trip (self-content).
But we need not rely on intuitions. William James (1890) famously characterized the feeling of
recollecting personal memories as warm and intimate. I take it that the salience of self-content is (at least
part of) what generates this feeling.19 But how does this happen? Amygdaloid contributions to episodic
recollection are well-established (Cahill 1995; Phelps and Anderson 1997). In fact both Markowitsch et
al. (1997) and Fink et al. (1996) demonstrated amygdaloid activation for recollection of personal, but not
impersonal memories. It is thought that the amygdala contributes a unique affective quality to the
recollection of personal memories, hence the warmth and intimacy that James described.20
But why does the amygdala activate in recollection of personal memories? Schmitz and Johnson
(2006) identified a ventral MPFC network that includes the amygdala, insula, and nucleus accumbens.
These researchers performed fMRI imaging during an appraisal task. Subjects were asked to decide if
presented personality traits applied to themselves (self-appraisal condition) or whether the personality
20 It is also worth noting that Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) argued that missing affective glow for perception of
loved ones in Capgras’ syndrome is caused by missing amygdala connections.
19 Because I think saliency is only a necessary condition, not sufficient.
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trait was positive (non-self appraisal condition). In the self-appraisal condition, the ventral MPFC network
was activated. In the non-self appraisal condition, a more dorsal MPFC network was activated. This
suggests that self-related information activates the ventral MPFC and the limbic structures in this
network. In contrast, non-self related information does not activate the ventral MPFC. Thus, the
amygdaloid contributions in the self-appraisal condition are uniquely modulated by the ventral MPFC.
The most compelling evidence for the necessity of salience for feelings of ownership comes from
studies on depersonalization. Depersonalization is a disorder characterized by feelings of “unreality”. The
disorder can take many forms. Patients report feeling like their body is not real, they are in a dream,
and/or their thoughts are not real. Depersonalization can be local in the sense that only some parts of
patients’ experience feel unreal, or global in the sense that every aspect of their experience feels unreal.
Additionally, depersonalization can be primary or secondary. When depersonalization is secondary, it is
considered a symptom of a larger disorder, e.g., PTSD (for review see Sierra and David 2011. For book
length treatments see Sierra 2009; Simeon and Abugel 2006).
Sierra (2009) distinguish between four main symptoms in primary depersonalization:
(1) Anomalous body experience,
(2) Emotional numbing,
(3) Anomalous subjective recall, and
(4) Alienation from surroundings (pp.26-27).
Anomalous body experience can take many forms, but feeling like your body is not real is one example.
Anomalous subjective recall can also take many forms, but a common reporting is feeling like one’s
memories are not one’s own. In emotional numbing, patients report neither feeling happy nor sad, just
neutral or nothing at all. Finally, patients report feeling alienated from their environment, like the world is
constructed or dream-like. Importantly, patients intellectually know that things are not the way they feel
them to be, but nonetheless cannot shake the feelings. Consider the report of the following patient:
I feel some degree of ‘out of it’ all of the time, but it has almost become to be what I am used to
now. I get times when I feel very out of my body. I am looking at people, know who they are, but
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can’t place myself there. I remember events from the past, but don’t always see ‘me’ there. Even
photos of me look different. I don’t like the person I remember being. Looking in the mirror
proves difficult as I don’t always recognize the person looking back at me (Sierra 2009, pg.27;
emphasis added).
In the neuroscientific literature on depersonalization, the consensus view seems to be that the
disorder arises from emotional inhibition resulting from hyperactivity in prefrontal regions. For example,
Sierra and Berrios (1998) propose a cortico-limbic disconnection model (see also Phillips and Sierra
2003). In this model, hyperactive prefrontal regions inhibit anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala.
However, Simeon et al. (2000) conducted a PET study on a verbal memory task between patients and
healthy controls. The result of this study showed higher metabolism in occipital and parietal regions with
no changes in prefrontal regions for depersonalized patients. Poulin and Black (2006) commented on
Simeon and colleagues’ study saying the following:
The choice of a verbal memory task by Simeon and associates might account for the discrepancy
with the Sierra and Berrios model. An autobiographic rather than a verbal memory task might
have recruited limbic and medial prefrontal regions involved in self-referential mental activity
(pg.3).
Back in 2005, while describing the phenomenon of anomalous subjective recall, Sierra and
colleagues commented that no imaging studies of autobiographical recall in depersonalized patients had
been conducted. But that changed in 2007 when Hooper et al. conducted a study on dissociative PTSD
patients.21 Dissociative PTSD is a subtype of PTSD wherein patients dissociate from their traumatic
memories, i.e., they have anomalous subjective recall. Patients often report that recollection of these
events is like watching a film where the events did not really happen to them (Ataria 2014). In contrast,
patients with hyperarousal PTSD re-experience the traumatic events in high detail and vividness. Hooper
et al. (2007) showed that trauma reminders induced a dissociative response in dissociative PTSD subjects.
Imaging revealed hyperactivity of MPFC and hypoactivity of insula and amygdala. These results are
consistent with Sierra and Berrios’ cortico-limbic disconnection model (for a review see Lanius et al.
2011).
21 There are studies by Medford et al. (2006) and Medford et al. (2016), but these tested emotional memory, rather
than autobiographical memory.
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Evidently, what explains the feelings of alienation, unreality, or lack of ownership in
depersonalized patients with anomalous subjective recall is hyperactivity of MPFC and hypoactivity of
limbic structures. Thus, the distinctive contribution that limbic structures make in retrieval is necessary
for the feeling of ownership. These limbic contributions are part of what it is for self-related content to be
more salient than other-related content. Without such saliency, the feeling of ownership is lost. This is
because the salience of such content is partially constitutive of the supervenience base for the feeling of
ownership. Furthermore, if the limbic contributions are part of what it is for self-related contents to be
salient, then limbic contributions are part of self-bias processing.22 Indeed, depersonalized patients do not
benefit from self-bias (Farmer et al. 2020).
5.3 Application of the Model to RB
If this has been convincing, then we have evidence for each of the three parts of the
self-attentional model. We have evidence that (1) internal attention operates over memorial content in
local processing networks to increase gamma-band responses above threshold so that the memory is
broadcast to the global workspace (section2), (2) the typical salience of self-related contents is necessary
for the feeling of ownership (section 5.2), and (3) self-bias processing (on memorial content) is sufficient
for the production of the typical threshold level of salience (sections 3 and 4). If any one of these pieces is
disrupted in some way, then the feeling of ownership is disrupted.
For RB, he does have recollective experiences, so (1) is not disrupted. It is my contention that RB
has lost modulatory connections between the SAN and general attentional resources. Effectively, this
eliminates bias toward self-referential content thus diminishing the salience of that content. Typically,
self-related contents enjoy a higher salience than other-related contents in virtue of attentional biases
toward self-related content. So if the bias is eliminated, the saliency drops to the level of other-related
22 It is worth noting that Humphreys and Sui (2016) state that “future work should not only attempt to better
characterize the effective and functional connectivity between vmPFC and pSTS, but also try to elucidate which
intermediate cortical or subcortical nodes are missing in the SAN model and what modulatory role they may play”
(pg.25; emphasis added). My suggestion, informed by the evidence canvassed here, is that the amygdala and
probably the insula are modulated by MPFC and contribute to the high salience of self-related content. I agree
further work should attempt to test this.
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content. This was demonstrated in Moroz’s (1999) divided attention at retrieval experiments. Young
adults, in a divided attention paradigm, showed reduced “remember” responses for self-encoded stimuli.
Because self-related contents demand more attentional resources, retrieval of those contents under divided
attention conditions diminishes performance. We also saw this in Kurczek et al.’s (2015) MPFC damaged
patients who showed far less self-reference in episodic recall than healthy controls. In the case of RB, I
am not claiming that he has a damaged vmPFC. RB does not have an identity issue-- he can
self-represent. Rather, I am suggesting that the vmPFC cannot exert its normal influence on general
attention to increase the salience of self-content. So the self-content is broadcast at the same salience level
as other-related content. This effectively causes RB to not feel ownership over those memories. Finally,
Even if RB has typical connections between MPFC and limbic structures, the influence that MPFC has on
general attention is eliminated. It is possible, however, that RB has cortico-limbic disconnections in
addition to severed modulatory connections. Without a neuropsychological profile, it is hard to know for
sure. But given the evidence canvassed here, I think we can be confident that RB lacks typical salience of
self-related content, and this explains his lost feeling of ownership. Moreover, given the similarity in
phenomenology between RB and depersonalized patients with anomalous subjective recall, the
self-attentional model likely has wide applicability and is worth pursuing further (see section 6).
5.4 An Objection to the Necessity of Salience
Before moving forward, I want to consider an objection to the necessity of salience of
self-content for the feeling of ownership.23 Consider the following two memories:
Warm Football Game: I remember being at the football game, seeing the bright shining sun, the players
running up and down the field, and the beautiful mountains that formed the horizon. My team won 36-30.
It was such a close game! The final play was a hail mary from halfway down the field.
Cold Football Game: I remember being at the football game, how cold the air was on my face, my nose
was running uncontrollably, my hands were shaking, dry and cracked from the whipping wind. I couldn’t
get warm. I couldn’t wait for the game to end. I kept thinking to myself: how much longer is this gonna
take? I can’t wait to get home and warm up by the fire.
23 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for this fascinating and challenging objection.
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It seems plausible that the subject of these memories, call her Hayley, feels ownership over both of these
memories-- that they are experienced as things that happened to them. But it also seems plausible that in
warm football game, the saliency of self-content is diminished compared to cold football game. Indeed,
the details of warm football game are more focused on the external world, whereas the details of cold
football game are more focused on Hayley. But this is problematic because my view would predict that
Hayley lost the feeling of ownership with respect to warm football game if the saliency is diminished. So
saliency is not necessary for the feeling of ownership.
In way of response, I want to deny that the self-attentional model predicts that Hayley would lose
the feeling of ownership with respect to warm football game. Firstly, I agree that the self is more salient in
cold football game, than in warm football game, but this does not entail a lost feeling of ownership. On
the self-attentional model, there is a threshold level of saliency required for the feeling of ownership. So
there can be differences in saliency, granted the differences are above threshold, that do not make a
difference to the feeling of ownership. However, once the saliency of the self-content drops below
threshold, the feeling of ownership is lost.24
5.5 Explanation of RB’s Isolated Lack of Ownership
I now want to address a dimension of RB’s pathology that I noted in section 1. RB reported that
he lacked the feeling of ownership only for memories prior to the accident. That is, he felt that he owned
memories formed post-morbid. It would seem that the self-attentional model cannot explain this
asymmetry. This is because if there are severed modulatory connections between the vmPFC and general
attention, the lack of self-bias at retrieval would affect all memories regardless of when they were formed.
And if RB feels ownership despite the lack of self-bias, then salience of self-related content is not
necessary for the feeling of ownership.
24 At this point, the reader might reasonably wonder what the threshold is for the feeling of ownership. The reader
might also wonder what the proportion of saliency is compared to other content. I submit that while these are
interesting questions, they are empirical and warrant future investigation. As such, answering these questions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Intuitively, this seems right, but empirically this is likely not the case. Neuropsychological studies
on so-called “isolated amnesia” have revealed independence of retrograde and anterograde memory
processes (Goldberg et al. 1981; Hunkin et al. 1995; Kapur et al. 1992, 1996; Mattioli et al. 1996).
Isolated amnesia is described as having either retrograde or anterograde amnesia, but not both. Typically,
retrograde and anterograde amnesia co-occur. But there are some cases where patients have severe
retrograde amnesia, but relatively mild or non-existent anterograde amnesia.
Kapur et al. (1992) provided a neuropsychological and behavioral profile for a patient LT with
isolated retrograde amnesia. LT suffered a traumatic closed head injury. fMRI revealed multiple lesions in
the temporal lobes. Behavioral tests for anterograde and retrograde memory performance revealed typical
performance for anterograde, but marked deficiency for retrograde. In a comparison study for cued recall
of events pre- and post-morbid, LT could not recall any events premorbid, but recalled 20 post-morbid
events (the maximum for the test). To explain this asymmetry, Kapur and colleagues conclude that
different mechanisms must subserve retrograde and anterograde memory processes. Indeed, this seems to
be the consensus view among researchers studying isolated amnesia (see above cited works, and
Kopelman 1993 for a review). Moreover, retrograde memory processes seem to be further mechanistically
distinguishable. Kopelman (1993) argues on the basis of clinical evidence that temporal damage is
correlated with storage deficits, but prefrontal damage is correlated with retrieval deficits.
RB seems to have lost the feeling of ownership for premorbid memories (retrograde), but not for
post-morbid memories (anterograde). Thus, RB’s pathology can be seen as a very specific kind of isolated
retrograde disruption at retrieval. In particular, a disruption of retrograde self-bias processing at retrieval.
This is consistent with Kopelman’s position that prefrontal damage is correlated with retrieval deficits,
because I am claiming that RB has disrupted modulatory connections between the vmPFC and general
attention that impairs self-bias at retrieval.
If RB has an isolated retrograde self-bias deficit, this implies that there is anterograde self-bias
processing subserved by different mechanisms. RB’s anterograde self-bias processing seems to be
typically functioning because he reports that he feels ownership for memories formed post-morbid. If
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that’s right, then salience of self-content as a necessary condition for the feeling of ownership is not
threatened. As far as I know, there is no literature on this distinction, but it could explain RB’s curious
pathology. Therefore, it is worth further investigation.
In summary then, the self-attentional model of the feeling of ownership explains RB’s lack of
ownership by suggesting that RB has severed modulatry connections between the vmPFC and general
attentional resources. Severed connections eliminate self-bias processing at retrieval effectively
diminishing the saliency of self-related memorial content on par with other-related content. As I argued,
the typical high salience of self-related content (provided by self-bias processing) is necessary for the
feeling of ownership. Because self-bias processing at retrieval is impaired, salience is diminished below
typicality (to the level of other-related content). The self-content is then broadcast at the same salience
level as other-related content. Thus, RB lacks the feeling of ownership.
However, as noted, RB’s lack of feeling of ownership is not global, but isolated to pre-morbid
memories. This asymmetry can be accommodated by the self-attentional model by distinguishing between
retrograde and anterograde processes. Thus, RB has disrupted retrograde self-bias processing at retrieval,
but intact anterograde self-bias processing. Studies of isolated amnesia suggest mechanistic independence
of retrograde and anterograde memorial processes. So, it is possible that anterograde self-bias processes
are subserved by different mechanisms than the one identified in this paper. Indeed, it seems that must be
the case because if retrograde and anterograde self-bias are subserved by the same mechanism, then RB
should lack ownership for memories formed post-morbid as well. As I mentioned above, this specific
distinction has not been discussed in the literature, and as such, warrants further investigation. In the next
section, I will be discussing predictions of the self-attentional model, as well as potential future work.
6. Predictions and Further Work
In this section, I will discuss two predictions that the self-attentional model makes with respect to
RB. Then I will discuss two potential applications of the self-attentional model.
6.1 Predictions about RB
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Firstly, I argued that what explains RB’s loss of feeling of ownership over his (premorbid)
memories is diminished salience of self-related content as a result of impaired self-bias at retrieval. One
might think that impaired self-bias should disrupt other self-related processes and states besides
memories, e.g., occurrent perceptions, dreaming, imaginings. Perhaps RB should no longer experience the
cocktail party effect, for example. This is an interesting, and admittedly open question. Klein reports that
his interview with RB only focused on memories.25 So it is entirely possible that RB experiences lack of
ownership over other kinds of self-related states (or other kinds of disruptions). At least, there is no
evidence that RB’s disruptions are only related to memorial processes.
Second, and relatedly, there is much evidence that prospection, or imagining one’s personal
future, deploys similar neural resources as episodic recollection (De Brigard 2014; Gilbert and Wilson
2007; Schacter and Addis 2007). Indeed, Schacter, Addis, and Buckner (2007) argue, based on
neuroimaging results, that remembering the past and imagining the future is subserved by a core network
including medial prefrontal regions, posterior regions in the medial and lateral parietal cortex, the lateral
temporal cortex, and the medial temporal lobe. If I am right that medial prefrontal regions (vmPFC) are
responsible for self-bias processing at retrieval of episodic memories, then it’s likely that those regions are
playing the same role in imagining the personal future. Thus, RB might be similarly impaired for planning
for and imagining his personal future.
There is perhaps some minimal evidence that this prediction is true. Consider the following quote
from RB’s interview with Klein:
[I] was able to plan for the future. Although my working memory loss and lack of skill at
compensation made it challenging. When I slowly returned to work, it was hard to plan a
complex strategy. I had to think of useful things to do and then do them. The best compensation I
found was to separate the planning of the strategy from the execution. It worked best if I made a




It is true that RB could plan for the future, but as he says, it was difficult. Admittedly, it is not clear why it
was difficult. That is, it is not clear that lack of felt ownership was making it hard. But it is clear that we
cannot rule it out.26
6.2 Applications and Future Work
Having discussed two predictions of the self-attentional model, I turn now to potential
applications of this model to two other psychological conditions: depression and schizophrenia. Patients
with these conditions have self-related processing, attentional, and autobiographical memory deficits. The
self-attentional model might have resources to explain these deficits holistically. For sake of space,
discussion will be brief.
6.2.1 Depression
Depression is often characterized by increased self-focus with respect to negative stimuli (Smith
and Greenberg 1981). That is, increased attention to negative stimuli in relation to the self. Lemogne et al.
(2012) argue, on the basis of several fMRI results, that there are, “two modes of elevated MPFC
activation in major depression, either tonic in ventral MPFC or phasic in dorsal MPFC” (Lemogne et al.
2012; pg.e7). The authors suggest that ventral MPFC activation is associated with automatic depressive
self-focus, whereas dorsal activation is associated with strategic depressive self-focus. Automatic
self-focus is implicit and unconsciously driven. In contrast, strategic self-focus is explicit.27 Both cases of
elevated activation arise from lack of inhibition of the default network. Indeed, the researchers report that
“compared to controls, and consistent with activation findings, depressed patients displayed an increased
functional connectivity between [ventral] MPFC region, the DLPFC and the dorsal MPFC, including the
supragenual ACC” (Lemogne et al. 2012; pg.e8). The DLPFC, as we saw in the discussion of Humphreys
and Sui (2016), is implicated in general attentional control. Overall, it seems that depressive self-focus is
explained by heightened activation of both (or either) ventral and dorsal MPFC. This heightened
27 Lemogne and colleagues claim that automatic tagging of incoming information is a paradigmatic case of
automatic self-focus and self appraisal judgements are cases of strategic self-focus (see pg.e8).
26 It is also worth noting that this quote is the first (and as far as I know, only) time we are told that RB had working
memory loss.
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activation evidently makes demands of general attentional resources toward negative stimuli. This results
in depressive phenomenology.
As it turns out, this (self-) attentional impairment is not unrelated to another symptom of
depression: impaired episodic autobiographical recall. Lemogne et al. (2005) gave depressed individuals
an autobiographical memory task to assess their recall of positive and negative personal memories along
three dimensions: specificity, autonoetic consciousness (remember/know), and perspective (field versus
observer). The results indicate that, compared to controls, depressed subjects score higher for negative
memories and lower for positive memories along all three dimensions.
The self-attentional model that I have put forward to explain RB’s pathology, can be used to
explain both the attentional and episodic memory impairments. First, ventral MPFC was implicated in
heightened depressive self-focus. If Humphreys and Sui are right about the interactions between the SAN
and general attention, then the ventral MPFC, in being biased toward negatively valenced self-related
memorial contents, influences general attention to increase the salience of those contents. When broadcast
to the global workspace, those negatively valenced self-related contents are experienced more vividly
than unbiased positive memories. Moreover, due to the comparative salience of negative versus positive
memories (negative being more salient), all else being equal, the negative memories will have a
heightened feeling of ownership than the positive memories. At least, this is a prediction made by my
explanation of RB’s lack of ownership. It is worth further investigation. In summary, the attentional and
autobiographical memory impairments in depressed populations can potentially be explained holistically
by the self-attentional model.
6.2.2 Schizophrenia
Self-disturbances are a hallmark of schizophrenia. Self-disturbances range from
source-monitoring deficits, lack of sense of bodily and agential ownership, and impaired autobiographical
memory encoding and retrieval (for a review see Nelson et al. 2014a,b). For autobiographical memory,
patients typically have overgeneral retrieval and a lack of specificity in details. Overgeneral retrieval is
when a subject is asked to recall an event from a specific time and place, but instead retrieves multiple,
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extended events and/or repeated events (McLeod et al. 2006). Patients also experience auditory
hallucinations which are thought to result from inner speech not recognized as such (Frith and Done
1989).
Recent neuroimaging studies have revealed abnormal activity in self-related processing areas. For
example, Chai et al. (2017) measured resting state activity using fMRI and found decoupling between
ventral MPFC and DLPFC. In a meta-analysis of resting state imaging studies, Kühn and Gallinat (2013)
found hypoactivity in ventral MPFC. Finally, Mier et al. (2017) had patients perform a social-cognitive
task during fMRI and found hyperactivity of right and left posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS).28
Recall that the SAN has two components: the ventral MPFC and the left pSTS. The SAN picks up
self-related contents and modulates general attention (including DLPFC). If schizophrenic patients have
decoupled connectivity between ventral MPFC and DLPFC, then self-bias should be minimized or
non-existent. Moreover, hypo-ventral MPFC activity suggests deficient self-representation. Lastly,
increased activity of pSTS, because it modulates ventral MPFC in the SAN, suggests inhibited
self-representation.29
All of this is convincingly explanatory for the schizophrenia patients’ degraded sense of self. But
as far as I can tell, no studies have been done on the sense of ownership over personal episodic memories
in schizophrenia patients. The prediction of the self-attentional model is that these patients would have a
degraded or eliminated sense of ownership. One barrier to testing this, however, is that many patients
have difficulty even retrieving personal memories (Gold et al. 1992), and when they do retrieve them,
they often are overgeneral and lacking details. A degraded sense of ownership might be a result of the
lack of detail, and not necessarily lack of self-bias.
Relatedly, Jimenez et al. (2018) performed an fMRI study on controls and schizophrenic patients
to assess the self-reference effect (SRE) at encoding and retrieval. Interestingly, there was no significant
difference in performance between the groups for the self-condition. However, fMRI revealed differences
29 It is worth mentioning that Pankow et al. (2015) argue that schizophrenia patients attribute salience to non-self
related stimuli and this is (at least partly) explained by the hypoactivity of ventral MPFC.
28 See also Shin et al. (2015).
30
in activity between the controls and patients. Controls showed higher activation in ventral MPFC for self
versus other, but patients showed no difference in activation. The imaging data is consistent with the
above evidence for hypoactivity in ventral MPFC, but inconsistent with the self-attentional model’s
prediction that self-bias would be eliminated. Nonetheless, Jimenez et al. conclude that patients did not
benefit from SRE at retrieval. Here’s what they say:
These findings suggest that either the conceptual or abstract representation of self may not be as
well established in schizophrenia, or that perhaps patients have an impaired ability to distinguish
self from other, or both. Furthermore, at retrieval, patients failed to demonstrate differentiation at
the neural level between words previously encoding with respect to the self versus other. This
suggests that at retrieval patients did not benefit from enhanced self-processing at encoding to the
same degree as controls (2018, pg.26).
This is hardly satisfying given the behavioral results. Mere neural differences do not seem to be sufficient
to show that patients did not benefit from SRE, given that they performed on par with controls. At any
rate, this is the only study I know of that tests recall in schizophrenia using an SRE paradigm. More work
needs to be done.
7. Conclusion
Episodic recollection typically involves a feeling that the remembered events happened to the
rememberer-- the feeling of ownership. Klein thinks that this feeling is a constituent of autonoetic
consciousness. But sometimes the feeling of ownership can be disrupted or eliminated. Patient RB lost the
feeling of ownership for memories formed premorbidly. This paper put forward a causal explanation of
RB’s phenomenology-- the self-attentional model. On this model, RB lost modulatory connections
between the self-attentional network and general attentional resources. More specifically, the modulatory
connections between the ventral MPFC and general attention has been disrupted. This disruption
effectively eliminates self-bias processing at retrieval which diminishes the saliency of self-related
content. Typically, self-related content enjoy a higher level of salience than other-related content. This
higher level of salience, I argued, is provided (at least in part) by limbic contributions modulated by the
MPFC. When salience of self-related content is diminished to the level of other-related content, the
feeling of ownership is lost because that high salience is necessary for the feeling of ownership. Thus,
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when RB’s memorial content is broadcast to the global workspace, it is experienced in the same way as
other-related content.
Additionally, RB claims that he feels ownership over memories formed post-morbidly. This
asymmetry, I argued, can be accommodated by the self-attentional model by distinguishing between
retrograde and anterograde memory processes, a well-established distinction in the literature on isolated
retrograde amnesia. The novel contribution I made here was to suggest that RB’s post-morbid feelings of
ownership can be explained by independent anterograde self-bias processes that are not impaired.
Whereas, his lost feelings of ownership for premorbid memories is explained by retrograde self-bias
processes that are impaired. If it is the case that self-bias takes place at retrieval to endow self-related
contents with their distinctive salience, then self-bias processes are memorial processes that can be either
retrograde or anterograde. Further studies need to be done to test this hypothesis, however.
The self-attentional model does not merely explain RB’s condition, but has much wider
applicability. I discussed anomalous subjective recall in depersonalization disorder where patients feel
like the events in their memories did not happen to them. The similarity in phenomenology to RB
suggests that the self-attentional model can potentially explain some aspects of depersonalization. I also
discussed how the attentional, memorial, and self-related impairments in depression and schizophrenia
might be holistically explained by the self-attentional model as well. But there are other
psychopathological cases involving disturbances of the self that might benefit from the self-attentional
model, e.g., dissociative identity disorder and bipolar disorder.
Psychopathological cases aside, if the self-attentional model can (at least partially) explain the
feeling of ownership, and the feeling of ownership is a constituent of autonoetic consciousness, then we
have made some progress toward identifying the neural correlates of autonoetic consciousness.30 In
discussing the case of RB, Klein suggests that episodic memory is a kind of mental experience that is
distinguished from semantic memory, not by content, but by whether autonoetic consciousness attaches to
30 I say that the self-attentional model can at least partially explain the feeling of ownership because I think that the
model puts forward only a necessary condition for ownership, not a sufficient condition.
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content at retrieval. I take it that I have gone some way toward identifying the “binding mechanism” that
Klein had in mind.
One limitation of this project is that RB does not have a neuropsychological profile. Indeed, the
only data on RB that we have are selected quotes from an interview with Klein. As such, the proposed
model was created based solely on these phenomenological reports. However, given the similarity in
phenomenology between RB and depersonalized patients, and given that we have neuropsychological
studies on depersonalized patients, the self-attentional model is not baseless. Indeed, the model is
empirically testable and explanatorily and predictively robust. The hope is that further empirical work will
be done to confirm or disconfirm the model’s predictions.
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